

THE

TRUE POLICY OF THE SOUTH:

FROM THE

AUSTIN (TEXAS) STATE GAZETTE.

THE TRUE POLICY OF THE SOUTH.

THE political sceptre has departed from the South, and there is now no protection for her rights but the Constitution, and those patriotic and national men at the North whose devotion to the whole Union and the Constitution, as it has caused them to stand by that instrument, and have thus far enabled the South to defend herself against the encroachments of fanaticism and treason. But how long may we look to that source for protection and defence? We have seen those men, one by one, cut down, politically, to rise no more, and their places filled with the most virulent and unrelenting enemies to the South and southern institutions. How long we may look to any portion of the North for help it is not difficult to tell. Northern fanaticism has taken possession of the national House of Representatives. Should its forces cohere, it may possibly (but it is a mere possibility) elect a free-soiler to the next Presidency. Should this war against southern institutions succeed in that respect, our only hope will then be in the American Senate. But this support would soon be stricken down.

There are now sixteen free States out of thirty-one, and of the remaining fifteen, Delaware is but nominally a slave State. The influence of a free-soil administration, with all its power and patronage, brought to bear in connection with the rabid spirit of malevolence which seems to pervade large masses of the northern people, would prostrate every northern senator who would boldly stand by the Constitution; and, in addition to these causes of fear, if we look to the Territories, we will find that the South cannot hope to look for future succor to that source when they shall have become States.

The future to the South is of fearful import. Unless the Great Ruler of nations shall interpose and stay the desecrating hands of northern fanatics and traitors, the issue may be presented to us: either the Union, with the loss of \$1,200,000,000 of property, with an inferior race of three or four millions turned loose among us to riot without restraint, or a dissolution of the Union, with all the horrors that may attend it.

While no truly southern man would hesitate a moment in choosing which side of this issue he would take, every patriot would hope to escape it. But to us it seems inevitable, unless the people of the South shall change their political and domestic economy, so as to regain their political strength in the Union, and by their political force compel the observance of their rights, under the Constitution, which a sense of justice and of duty is wholly unable to obtain from the northern people.

To do this she must have population—population in proportion to our extent of territory. We cannot look alone to the natural increase of our present population, but must hold out inducements to foreign emigration. To obtain a dense and compact population, we must be more than an agricultural people.

In our issues of the past two weeks we endeavored to show that the population and wealth of the northern States have resulted from their manufactures and internal improvements, and that the comparative weakness of the

South has resulted from the want of them. We believe that our readers who have read those articles have come to our conclusions upon the subject. Who believes that the State of Massachusetts would have, on the small extent of 7,500 square miles, one million of population; that her real estate would, in 1850, have been valued at \$349,129,932, but for her manufactures, which, at that time, gave employment to 165,938 of her people, and her railroads penetrating into every part and portion of the State? In consequence of the demand for the necessities of life, created by this aggregation of people, engaged in manufacturing, internal improvements, and the various pursuits incidental to and dependent upon them, the Massachusetts farmer will spend three hundred dollars in removing the rock and stones from a single acre of land, in order to cultivate it, and finds it a profitable investment.

Reasoning, from cause to effect, of the future by the past, it will be easy to demonstrate the consequences of an extensive system of manufactures and internal improvements in the South, not only upon our own section of the Union, but upon the North and also upon Europe.

As in the northern States, manufacturing towns and villages would spring up on all our streams capable of running a mill; employment would be given to millions of operatives, cities would grow up at the termini of our railroads, and every depot would become a considerable town or village; hundreds of other occupations and pursuits would result, giving profitable employment. These things would again act upon the agricultural interests of the country, by affording a demand for the necessities of life, and a home market for our great staples, and the facilities for cheap and rapid transportation; the products of the farmer and the value of real estate would be immensely increased.

Our commerce would undergo a perfect revolution. We now export the raw material, which is manufactured in New England and Europe, and enters into the clothing of a large proportion of the world. We would then export the manufactured fabrics, having in our own hands a complete monopoly. We now furnish two-thirds of the exports of the United States, and have permitted northern capitalists, factors, and brokers to subject us to tribute, in forcing those exports through their hands, instead of allowing them to pursue a direct and natural course. Our exports form the basis of two-thirds of the imports of the Union, which are landed in northern cities, and enriching them at our expense. We would, then, by exporting the manufactured article, and manufacturing a large amount of what we now import, redeem ourselves from our present vassalage and thralldom.

The millions now paid by the importing merchant by way of tariff, and which is repaid to him with a per cent. by the southern consumer, would be cut off, and cease to be an everlasting drain upon the currency of the South.

The tide of European emigration would be diverted from the North to the South, and the millions of money and thousands of operatives now annually arriving there would be invested and employed here.

Let the South but adopt a system of manufactures and internal improvements to the extent which her interests require, her danger demands, and her ability is able to accomplish, and in a few years northern fanaticism and abolitionism may rave, gnash their teeth, and howl in vain.

The effects upon the North would be equally striking. The South can manufacture cheaper than the North, as we design to show hereafter. We would then produce those articles of home consumption which she now sends us. Southern manufactures would be able to enter the markets of the world, and undersell those of New England and Great Britain; and that fact once demonstrated, the increase of our production would be commensurate with the wants of the world. The millions which the North annually receives from the South would be cut off. She would no longer be able to levy tribute upon us.

The whole revenues of our government now paid by the southern consumer, but collected and disbursed at the North, would be levied more justly and distributed more equally.

Let northern folly, bigotry, and intolerance drive the foreign emigrant, the naturalized citizen, and the Roman Catholic from amongst them, it is the true policy of the South to receive them, granting them all the privileges extended to them by the Constitution and laws of our country. They will swell our population and increase our ability to defend ourselves against abolitionism and freesoilism, which are but the correlatives of northern know-nothingism.

The effects upon Europe, and particularly upon Great Britain, would be equally striking. Our northern manufacturers are now able to enter into the markets of the world and undersell those of Great Britain. The southern manufacturer could do it with more ease. In time, instead of shipping three millions of bales of cotton to Europe to supply her manufactures, we would ship that amount of fabrics. Our facilities for manufacturing cheaper would enable us to undersell and monopolize the market; this would draw the European operatives here, who could not be as profitably employed there. The consequences to European, and particularly to British manufacturers, can easily be perceived; they would be crippled, if not prostrated.

None are more sensible of these facts than British statesmen. They are fully advised of the consequences to British manufactures and to the British empire that would result from the establishment of a sufficient amount of manufactures in the United States to supply the markets of the world. Theirs would have to go down, and with it their empire. It is the decree of fate, and as certain as truth. Her national debt may bind her capitalists to her government, but it is her manufactures that give investment to a larger amount of capital and quiets the slumbering volcano by giving employment and bread and clothing to the masses of her population.

As an evidence of the views of British statesmen upon this subject, we need but refer to their position in regard to know-nothingism and abolitionism. True to the instincts of interest, their sympathies are with both the know-nothing and the abolitionist; with the know-nothings, because, if their principles could be established as the policy of our government, the thousands of laborers and the millions of money which annually leave Europe for this country, weakening the former and strengthening the latter, and at the same time weakening the devotion of the masses to the despots of the Old World, by furnishing them with a correct knowledge of the free institutions of the New, would be cut off, and our growth correspondingly impeded. Our ability to compete with Great Britain in both commerce and manufactures is dependent upon the increase of our population and wealth. If a policy should be adopted by our country which would drive from us all the accessions which we receive from emigration, the alarms of Great Britain, which have been excited by our rapid strides to giant greatness, would, in a degree, be quieted.

The causes for British sympathy with abolitionism are still more palpable. It has been demonstrated by actual experiment that the people of the United States can manufacture cheaper than those of Great Britain; they have been able to enter the markets of the world and undersell them. The prosperity of the manufacturing establishments of the latter is dependent upon restricting the former. The raw material to both is supplied by the products of the South. While the Union lasts, the cost of cotton will be less in Lowell than in Manchester.

But could the spirit of abolitionism be so generally excited at the North to such a frenzy as to sever the Union, with all the consequent bitterness, heart-burnings, border wars, and bloodshed, the case would be different. The North and the South would then be independent nations and foreign countries to each other. Great Britain, by taking advantage of the state of excitement existing between them, would be able to form commercial treaties with the latter to the prejudice of the former, like that which she proposed to Texas to prevent her annexation to the Union, which would give her complete control of the cotton grown at the South, and would supply her with the manufactures which she now receives from the North. This would give

to Great Britain a monopoly of the trade of the world, by breaking down her only rival. The national and commercial power of the United States would be annihilated. Despotisms would no longer dread the influence of her example. Slavery would not be abolished; cotton would still be grown at the South, but for the benefit of British capitalists and British manufacturers. These are the causes of British sympathy with northern abolitionism. It is not intended to free the slave, but to destroy the northern manufacturer.

Northern fanaticism cannot see these things--we of the South can. It is, then, our true policy to place ourselves in such a situation as will enable us, let events be as they may, to be alike independent of both.

REMARKS.

How far it is true that the sceptre has departed from the South, our southern friends must decide for themselves. Without asserting that such is yet the case, it is safe to assert that the day is near at hand when it must be so, and it is certainly wise in the author of this paper to call to *the present* the attention of his friends with a view to reflection as to what may be expected in *the future*. He has studied the changes of the last sixty years, and has seen that, whereas under the first census the South had an equal number of Senators, and but little less than an equal number of Representatives, she is now in a minority on the floor of the Senate, while on that of the House her representation is but in the proportion of three to five, and the future promises to be far worse even than this. Before another ten years shall have elapsed, Kansas and Nebraska, Minnesota and Superior, Oregon and Washington, will probably have become candidates for admission into the Union, each bringing with it its two Senators, and each increasing the difference that even now exists in the upper House of Congress, while adding so largely to the representation of the free States in the lower one, that the proportions must soon stand there as but three to seven.

Why is this? why is it that the South, with all its advantages of soil and climate, proves now so weak that it begins to dread the future? Because it has sought for strength in the Senate and not in the House. Because its policy has looked to dispersing its comparatively slowly growing population over a large surface, when it should have looked to strengthening itself on the ground already occupied. It has added Florida and Arkansas to the Union, and has thereby obtained four Senators; but, at the end of almost thirty years, those States have yet but three representatives, whereas Iowa, Michigan, and Wisconsin, so much younger as they are, have already nine, and promise to claim at the next apportionment more than twice that number. What has the South as a set-off against this? Nothing! But little probability exists that she will, at any time within twenty years, have a new State to offer to the Union, while there is great reason to believe that before that time Missouri will have taken her place among the free States. The South has been running a race with the North, but it has been the race of the elephant against the greyhound, and it is no matter of surprise that the former has been beaten. The planter moves slowly, for he must carry his slaves with him. The Yankee moves rapidly, for he has "a light heart and a thin pair of breeches," and has nothing to cause delay of movement. Again, the planter is retarded because of the difficulty attendant upon disposing of his old plantation—a difficulty steadily

increasing because of the perpetual exhaustion of its soil consequent upon raising nothing but what is needed for a distant market.

The policy of the two sections of the Union has differed totally, and hence their present differences of position. At the North, *the creation of new States has been forced by the action of the South*, not sought by the people of the northern States. The free trade policy of 1834-42 closed the mills and furnaces and mines of the country, and thus produced the enormous emigration of that day, to which was due the creation of the senatorial votes of Iowa and Wisconsin. The southern policy of 1845 produced the war with Mexico, and added the votes of California to those already existing in the Senate. The free trade policy of 1846 is now, and for years has been, producing the enormous emigration that not only fills up Wisconsin and Iowa, but creates the new States of Kansas and Nebraska, Minnesota and Superior, and as all these measures have been forced upon the South by the North, it follows that if the senatorial sceptre has departed from the South it has done so in obedience to southern votes, all of which have uniformly been given for a course of policy tending to produce the effects that now are witnessed.

The North has desired to keep her people at home by providing for them the sort of employment most agreeable to them—the one that is here desired for the South. It has sought to create for them a domestic demand for labor that would give value to its lands, and would enable them to find their interest in spending “three hundred dollars in removing the rock and stones from a single acre of land in order to cultivate it,” and having therein a more profitable investment than could be found in putting the same amount in land in Nebraska, even at the government price of a dollar and a quarter an acre. The South has desired to do the reverse, and has refused to create a domestic demand for labor, or to pursue that course which would give value to its lands. Its whole policy has looked to selling its soil in the shape of cotton, and then flying to distant lands, there to repeat the work of exhaustion; and what is now the consequence? The old State of Massachusetts has added to her population in the last five years 155,000 souls, while the comparatively new and unoccupied State of Georgia has added 25,000. The one has increased sixteen per cent., and the other two and a half per cent.! Need we desire better evidence as to the cause of southern weakness?

We are here told that the South “must have population—population in proportion to the extent of its territory.” Without that, it cannot, as we are assured, regain its “political strength in the Union.” It must obtain “a dense and compact population,” and to do this it “must become more than an agricultural people.” The “consequences of an extensive system of manufactures” would, as we here are told, be the same that have been witnessed in the northern States.

“As in the northern States, manufacturing towns and villages would spring up on all our streams capable of running a mill; employment would be given to millions of operatives, cities would grow up at the termini of our railroads, and every depot would become a considerable town or village; hundreds of other occupations and pursuits would result, giving profitable employment. These things would again act upon the agricultural interests of the country, by affording a demand for the necessities of life, and a home market for our great staples, and the facilities for cheap and rapid transportation; the products of the farmer and the value of real estate would be immensely increased.”

That this is all true no one will pretend to deny. All these effects would be produced, and further—

"Our commerce would undergo a perfect revolution. We now export the raw material, which is manufactured in New England and Europe, and enters into the clothing of a large proportion of the world. We would then export the manufactured fabric, having in our own hands a complete monopoly. We now furnish two-thirds of the exports of the United States, and have permitted northern capitalists, factors, and brokers to subject us to tribute, in forcing these exports through their hands, instead of allowing them to pursue a direct and natural course. Our exports form the basis of two-thirds of the imports of the Union, which are landed in northern cities, and enriching them at our expense. We would, then, by exporting the manufactured article, and manufacturing a large amount of what we now import, redeem ourselves from our present vassalage and thralldom.

"The millions now paid by the importing merchant by way of tariff, and which is repaid to him with a per cent. by the southern consumer, would be cut off, and cease to be an everlasting drain upon the currency of the South.

"The tide of European emigration would be diverted from the North to the South, and the millions of money and thousands of operatives now annually arriving there would be invested and employed here.

"Let the South but adopt a system of manufactures and internal improvements to the extent which her interests require, her danger demands, and her ability is able to accomplish, and in a few years northern fanaticism and abolitionism may rave, gnash their teeth, and howl in vain."

As to the importance of all these objects no one can doubt, however much some might differ from others as to the mode by which they were to be attained. If the South *could* diversify its employments—if it *could* become something more than a mere agricultural people—it might become rich, populous, and strong; but *can* it do these things? Past experience says that it cannot, as will now be shown. A dozen years since the South produced but little more than a hundred thousand hogsheads of sugar, but by the tariff of 1842 the duty was increased to three cents per pound, and forthwith the production was so greatly stimulated that five years later the quantity had doubled, while the machinery of production had greatly improved. The consequence of that improvement was that the process was continued until not less than *four hundred plantations had been transferred from cotton to sugar*, and the crop rose to more than four hundred thousand hogsheads, or as much as the whole export of Cuba ten years since. Now, however, sugar has ceased to be protected, and the consequences are seen in the facts that one-third of those plantations have gone back to cotton, that the crop has been reduced to about two-thirds, and that the process of return is still in operation with every prospect that but a few years hence the quantity produced will be little greater than it was in 1842. If, now, the South cannot so far diversify its labor as to combine sugar with cotton, what chance is there that it should be able to perform the still more difficult operation of manufacturing its cotton?

In reply to this question, we have the facts that, up to a dozen years since, scarcely any cotton was manufactured south of the Potomac; that under the tariff of 1842 the manufacture grew so rapidly that in 1848 the consumption south of that river absorbed little short of 200,000 bales; that since that time, under the operation of the tariff of 1846, the mills of Carolina and Georgia have to a great extent been closed with ruin to their owners; and that so far from there being any disposition to build new ones, all that is desired by the owners of old ones is to get them off

their hands, forsaking for the future all connection with manufactures. If the old mills cannot be maintained, what inducement can be offered for the building of new ones? None, that we can see, unless, as the writer of this article suggests, there be some change in "the political and domestic economy of the South tending to enable them to regain their place in the Union."

Seven years since, southern manufactures were still prosperous, and it was then predicted by an eminent Carolinian that within ten years Carolina would cease to send abroad cotton that *must* go to Liverpool, and would send in its place cotton yarn, by help of which it would be enabled to have direct trade with France, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, and Russia; as a consequence of which the dependence on the North would be much diminished. A few of those years have now gone by, and how far have they tended towards the realization of the prophecy? Have more southern mills been built? Has the consumption of cotton increased? Does the South export yarn, or does it still export cotton? Instead of building new mills, the old ones have been abandoned. Instead of increasing the domestic consumption of cotton, it has largely decreased. *Instead of substituting yarn for cotton, the South is now busily engaged in substituting cotton for sugar, and thus still further restricting the range of its employments.* Instead of diminishing its dependence on the North and on Liverpool, it is now greater than it has ever been, and it increases from day to day.

"The South," as we have been told, "can manufacture cheaper than the North"—and if it would but manufacture it certainly could, with a certain and most important class of products, "enter the markets of the world, and undersell those of New England and Great Britain;" but the misfortune is, that it does not, and will not do it. A few years since, when southern mills were rapidly being built, northern manufacturers were fully prepared to say to the South: "Do you take the coarse goods, and we will take the fine ones, and thus each will profit by the labors of the other." Unhappily, however, the tariff of 1846, with its ad valorem duties, struck down the finer departments of manufacture, and drove the northern people back to the coarser ones, the consequences of which were seen in the fact that Massachusetts and Georgia were forced into competition, each trying to undersell the other, until at length the youngest and weakest went to the wall, and southern manufactures, to a great extent, disappeared.

In the face of all these facts we are told that the South must diversify its industry—that it must manufacture goods for itself and the world—that it must have direct trade with the world—that it must become less dependent upon New and Old England—that it must build up towns and cities—and that, doing so, "in time, instead of shipping three millions of bales of cotton to Europe, we would ship that amount of fabrics;" as a necessary consequence of which, "British manufactures would be crippled, if not prostrated." These are brave words, but unfortunately they are words only, and such words as have been repeated by the South for the last twenty years, during no part of which has any progress been made in the direction of carrying them into effect, *except during the few years which followed the passage of the tariff of 1842*, a measure repudiated by the South. By help of that tariff, southern manufactures grew rapidly, and had it continued in existence, the southern consumption would long ere this have reached half a million of bales; and each step in that direction would have been but the preparation for a new and greater one. Had that

tariff been continued, the number of plantations turned from cotton to sugar would probably before this time have reached a thousand, supplying the whole demand of the country. As it was not continued, cotton mills are abandoned, and sugar plantations are turned to cotton, and the weakness of the South grows from day to day.

Every hand turned from growing cotton to spinning and weaving, tends to diminish the number of bales sent to market, and to raise its price. Every plantation turned from cotton to sugar tends to diminish the number of bales sent to market, and to raise its price. Under the tariff of 1842, thousands of hands were turned to the building of mills and the management of spindles and looms, and hundreds of plantations from the raising of cotton to that of sugar; and every movement in that direction tended to raising the price of cotton and to the strengthening of the South. Under the tariff of 1846, the hands have been driven from the loom to the cotton field, and the lands from the raising of sugar to that of cotton; and when the South has thus done all in its power to weaken itself, it complains that its sceptre has departed. If it has not already gone it soon must go, if the present exhausting policy be much longer continued.

But, we are told, the tariff of 1842 was "a bill of abominations"—it taxed the South—it lowered the price of cotton—and it raised the price of cotton and stopped its consumption, &c. &c. How far all this is true, we may now examine.

At the date of the passage of the first really protective tariff, that of 1828, the price of cotton was ten cents per pound. From that time the price went *steadily up*, until the compromise tariff commenced the reduction of protection in 1835, after which it went *steadily down*, until in 1841–2 it found a lower point than had been known, as is here shown:—

	Quantity.	Price.		Quantity.	Price.
Crop of 1828	866,000 bales	10	Crop of 1835	1,360,000 bales	16½
" 1829	976,000 "	10	" 1836	1,422,000 "	14
" 1830	1,038,000 "	9½	" 1837	1,801,000 "	10
" 1831	987,000 "	10	" 1838	1,360,000 "	14
" 1832	1,070,000 "	11	" 1839	2,177,000 "	8
" 1833	1,205,000 "	13	" 1840	1,634,000 "	10
" 1834	1,254,000 "	16½	" 1841	1,683,000 "	8

The two crops of the free-trade years averaged 1,650,000 bales, against 1,300,000 obtained six years before; and yet, small as was the increase, the price had fallen to half of what it before had been, and the South was nearly ruined. Such was the state of things at the date of the passage of the act of 1842, following which there were no less than four great crops, as follows:—

Crop of 1842 2,378,000 bales.

" 1843 2,030,000 "

" 1844 2,394,000 "

" 1845 2,100,000 "

Total, 8,902,000 Average 2,225,000

The crops of 1840 and 1841, although but 1,650,000 bales, had sunk the price to eight cents; and here we have, during the long period of four years, crops *forty per cent. greater* forced on a market already filled to overflowing. Need we wonder that, under such circumstances, the price continued low? It would certainly seem not. The price *was* low, fluctuating

between six and eight cents during all that time. What, however, was protection doing during all those years? Was it helping to sustain the planter, or contributing towards his ruin?

The prices had fallen in 1840 and 1841, because the quantity pressing on the English market was greater than was required to meet the demand—that is, there were not as many persons able and willing to buy cotton goods as there were persons anxious to sell cotton; and the reason for this may be found in the fact that from 1835 the consumption at home had been almost stationary, and was in 1841-2 but 50,000 bales greater than it had been seven years before. The increase had barely kept pace with the population; whereas, had the tariff of 1828 been permitted to remain, it would at least have doubled, and the price would have remained in 1842 where it had stood in 1835.

If the tariff of 1842 tended to increase the quantity pressing on the regulating market, Liverpool, then it tended to lower the price; but if, on the contrary, its operation was that of diminishing the quantity pressing on that market, then it tended to sustain the price. That the latter was its effect, would seem to be clear from the fact that the quantity consumed had risen from 267,000 bales in 1841-2, to almost half a million in 1846-7. The total increase taken up by the domestic market in those five years was not less than 800,000 bales, all of which, but for the tariff of 1842, would have been forced on the English markets, *and would have sunk the price to a point twenty-five per cent. lower than that to which it did fall.* It was, therefore, to the tariff of 1842, that the planters owed their preservation from the effects of the free trade measures of 1841-2.

But, it may be said, these bales of cotton still pressed on the market in the form of cloth, and to the planter it was unimportant whether they were manufactured in the mills of Manchester or of Lowell. How this is we may now inquire. In the two fiscal years ending Sept. 30, 1841, the imports of cotton goods from all the world averaged but ten millions of dollars, while of the crop made that year, the quantity consumed at home was but 267,000 bales. In 1846-7, the domestic consumption amounted to nearly half a million of bales, and the imports for the four years had increased one-half upon those of 1840 and 1841, above given—from which it follows that not only had all the excess of domestic consumption been withdrawn from the general market, but that, under protection, the demand for cotton goods manufactured abroad had so much increased as to produce a sensible increase in the demand for cotton in foreign markets, and thus to sustain the price not only by diminishing the supply in those markets, but also by increasing the demand upon their manufacturers.

All this, however, important as it was, constituted but a part of the advantages derived by cotton from the tariff of 1842. In 1842 the sugar crop but little exceeded 100,000, hogsheads, but by 1845 it had reached 200,000. Had the hands thus engaged been occupied in cultivating cotton, they would have added 200,000 bales to the supply, and cotton would have fallen to four cents a pound, as will be seen by the following facts:—

The domestic consumption of 1846-7 kept out of the foreign market, of the crop that was grown, not less than	200,000 bales.
The sugar culture diminished the crop	200,000 "
The increased import of foreign cottons was at least .	30,000 "

430,000 "

Looking dispassionately at these facts, may we not safely conclude that the planters owed their salvation to the tariff of 1842, and that in striking it down, they did what was in their power to bring about the present state of things, when "the sceptre is departing," if, indeed, it has not already departed from their hands?

Seven years since, the domestic consumption of cotton had risen to more than 600,000 bales; since then it has greatly fallen, but under the stimulus of California gold it rose again, but now again is falling, the consumption north of the Potomac of the last crop having been only 593,000 bales, and the total consumption of the country having probably been short of 650,000 bales. In that time the crop has reached three millions, and as the whole increase is, because of southern policy, forced upon the European market, we need not be surprised that it continues low in price. Had the tariff of 1842 been maintained, the domestic consumption would now be a million of bales, and the quantity required to go to Europe would not exceed two millions; and if that were now the case, *the planter would be getting more for two bales than he now receives for three.* Nevertheless, during all the time that has thus elapsed, our southern friends have been holding meetings in reference to direct trade and emancipation from Old and New England! Need we wonder that the sceptre is departing, when every measure of the South tends to prevent the existence of direct trade, and to increase her dependence on the looms of Manchester and of Lowell?

British statesmen sympathize, as we here are told, with abolitionism. Why they do so is, as is added, that they desire "a monopoly of the trade of the world." Could they accomplish their object, "slavery," as we are assured, "would not be abolished—cotton would still be grown at the South "for the benefit of British capitalists and manufacturers. These are the "causes of British sympathy with northern abolitionism. It is not intended "to free the slave, but to destroy the northern manufacturers. Northern "fanaticism cannot see these things as we of the South can. It is then our "true policy to place ourselves in such a situation as will enable us, let events "be as they may, to be independent of both."

This is all right; but the question recurs, How is it to be done? Newspaper and magazine articles will not do it. Conventions will not do it. If they could, it would long since have been done. Governors' messages will not do it, for that expedient has been often tried. Nothing short of the adoption of measures looking to the naturalization of manufactures in the South will do it. Any such measures, however, smack of protection, and the South has long since, apparently, determined to consider anything of that kind as heretical, and to continue to cling to that species of free trade which requires that it should have no direct trade with the world, and that its people should make all their exchanges with their near neighbors of Kentucky and Ohio, through the machinery of Lowell and of Manchester. This is freedom of trade of a very peculiar sort, and it is scarcely to be wondered at that people, who find anything like freedom in such a system, should see the sceptre departing from their hands. It is of such free trade as this that a recent southern writer says:—

"Under the system of free trade a fertile soil, with good rivers and roads as outlets, becomes the greatest evil with which a country can be afflicted. The richness of soil invites to agriculture, and the roads and rivers carry off the crops, to be exchanged for the manufactures of poorer regions, where are situated the centres of trade, of capital, and manufactures. In a few centuries, or less time, the consumption abroad of the crops impoverishes the soil

where they are made. No cities or manufactorys arise in the country with this fertile soil, because there is no occasion. No pursuits are carried on requiring intelligence or skill; the population is of necessity sparse, ignorant, and illiterate; universal absenteeism prevails; the rich go off for pleasure and education, the enterprising poor for employment. An intelligent friend suggests that, left to nature, the evil will cure itself. So it may when the country is ruined, if the people, like those of Georgia, are of high character, and betake themselves to other pursuits than mere agriculture, and totally repudiate free trade doctrines. Our friends' objection only proves the truth of our theory. We are very sure that the wit of man can devise no means so effectual to impoverish a country as exclusive agriculture. The ravages of war, pestilence, and famine are soon effaced; centuries are required to restore an exhausted soil. The more rapidly money is made in such a country, enjoying free trade, the faster it is impoverished, for the draft on the soil is greater, and those who make good crops spend them abroad; those who make small ones, at home. In the absence of free trade, this rich region must manufacture for itself, build cities, erect schools and colleges, and carry on all the pursuits and provide for all the common wants of civilized man. Thus the money made at home would be spent and invested at home; the crops would be consumed at home; and each town and village would furnish manure to fertilize the soil around it. We believe it is a common theory that, without this domestic consumption, no soil can be kept permanently rich. A dense population would arise, because it would be required; the rich would have no further occasion to leave home for pleasure, nor the poor for employment.

"The valley of the Great Salt Lake is cut off by mountains from the rest of the world, except for travel. Suppose it to continue so cut off, and to be settled by a virtuous, enlightened people. Every trade, every art, every science, must be taught and practised within a small compass and by a small population, in order to gratify their wants and their tastes. The highest, most diffused, and intense civilization, with great accumulation of wealth, would be the necessary result. But let a river like the Mississippi pass through it—let its inhabitants become merely agricultural, and exchange their products for the manufactures of Europe and the fruits of Asia, and would not that civilization soon disappear, and with it the wealth and capital of the country? Mere agriculture requires no skill or education, few and cheap houses, and no permanent outlay of capital in the construction of the thousand edifices needed in a manufacturing country. Besides, the consumption of the crops abroad would be cheating their lands of that manure which nature intended for them. Soon the rich and enlightened, who owned property there, would, like Irish landlords, live and spend their incomes elsewhere."—*Sociology for the South.*

This, nevertheless, is the system advocated by the people who now complain that the sceptre of power is departing from their hands! If, under such circumstances, it remained with them, it would be wonderful.

But, we shall be told, "the North is now for free trade. Even Massachusetts is ready to join us in putting down custom-houses. This is a great triumph for our free trade principles." It would, doubtless, be so, if Massachusetts and the South had the same objects in view; but as the desires of the two parties are directly the opposite of each other, this extraordinary change in the one is the strongest proof of error in the other. Massachusetts has machinery and the skill by help of which to manage it. The South has neither.—Massachusetts prefers to have a monopoly of manufactures for the Union, and does not desire the adoption of any measure that can lead to competition. The South begins to feel that she is becoming weak because of her exclusive agriculture, and desires to enter into competition with the North.—Massachusetts desires that the competition to purchase

cotton may be small, in order that cotton may be cheap. The South desires to increase the competition for the purchase, that cotton may be dear.—Massachusetts desires that the competition to sell cloth may be little, that cloth may be dear. The South desires that there may be competition for the sale of cloth, that it may be cheap.—Massachusetts desires to do all the exchanging for the South, that she may receive large commissions and earn high freights. The South desires direct trade, that freights and commissions may be small—and thus, while the objects of the two are different, both unite as to the means by which those objects are to be attained! So it is with the South and Manchester; their objects are different, yet when the South desires to find how cotton may be dear and cloth may be cheap, she studies Manchester books! The objects of both cannot be attained, and therefore it is certain that one of the parties must profit by misleading the other. Which of them it is, is to be judged by the fact that Massachusetts and Manchester are both content with the results, as thus far ascertained, while the South now cries aloud for a change of system.

Railroads have been, and still continue to be, regarded as the sovereign specific for all the ills prevailing among the farming and planting interests of the country; but their tendency is directly opposite to that which is here regarded as "the true policy of the South." Instead of aiding in increasing the density of population and the diversification of employments, they tend only to scatter our people still more widely, as may be seen in the cases of New York and Ohio at the North, and Georgia at the South. No States, in their respective portions of the Union, have been so much distinguished for the energy with which they have gone into this work; but there are none whose experience more fully proves that roads alone are not sufficient. Outside of her two cities, New York has ceased to grow, while the ratio of growth in Ohio is rapidly declining; and Georgia now increases, as has been shown, at the rate of only one-half of one per cent. per annum. The more roads she makes, the greater is the facility for exhausting her land, and the greater is the tendency towards the abandonment of her soil, towards the dispersion of her population, and towards the loss by the State of the place she heretofore has occupied in the Union. Such is the tendency of the whole southern policy; and whenever the time shall have arrived when the sceptre shall have departed altogether from southern hands, her people will have themselves alone to blame for it.

Manufactures tend to the condensation of population and to the increase of strength. Massachusetts can manufacture even under the existing system, but Georgia cannot; and, as a consequence, manufactures tend to centralize themselves in New England, while the South tends to become from day to day more exclusively agricultural. With every step in that direction the difficulty of competition on the part of the South tends to increase, and yet with every one we have new declarations from the South of the necessity for diversifying its employments, while driving all her people from the culture of sugar to that of cotton. Ten years since the superiority of the North was not so great as it is now, for during all that time the former has been perfecting her machinery to try and meet the southern free trade policy, under which southern manufactures have in a great degree disappeared. Ten years hence the difficulties of the South will be greater than they are now, unless it shall awaken to the fact that *it is the new beginner that most needs protection*, and shall unite with the North in a system that will enable Massachusetts to make fine goods, and abandon to the South and the Southwest the manufacture of coarse ones. Between their real

interests there is no discord whatever, and harmony will be restored to the Union whenever the South shall come to see that the policy desired by the North is the one that will most enrich and strengthen the South and the Union.

That policy is the one looking to the production of competition with England for the purchase of cotton. *That competition exists nowhere except under protection.* It does exist in France, Belgium, Denmark, Russia, and Germany, the protected countries of Europe. It grew rapidly here under the tariff of 1842, and it has declined under that of 1846. It has no existence in Turkey, Portugal, Italy, Brazil, or any other unprotected country of the world. Free trade desires that cotton may be cheap. Protection tends to make cotton dear, because it increases the number of markets in which it can be sold. Every measure of Great Britain is now directed towards increasing the competition for the *sale* of cotton, and diminishing the competition for the *purchase* of it; and hence it is that the South has need of commercial coaventions, all of which must result in failure until they shall determine to adopt the measures required for bringing the artisan to the side of the farmer, and thus diversifying their employments. Those measures are to be found in efficient protection.

The South is running a race with the North for power, and pursues a policy that forces the North to create two States for her one.

The South is desirous of increasing in strength, and she pursues a policy that exhausts her soil and scatters her people.

The South is anxious for direct trade, and she pursues a policy that compels her to send all her products to Lowell or Manchester.

The South desires to diversify the employments of her people, and she pursues a policy that drives them from the cultivation of sugar to that of cotton.

The South desires that cotton may be high, and she pursues a policy that tends to increase the competition for its sale, and to lower its price.

The South is opposed to abolitionism, and she pursues a policy that is advocated by all the real abolitionists—the men who would interfere throughout the South with the relations of the master and the slave.

The South selects her allies among her enemies, and she treats as enemies those who would desire to be her friends; and, doing so, she finds the sceptre departing from her hands.

Is it not time that our southern friends should awaken to the fact that the true way to strengthen themselves is to adopt the course indicated by the editor of the Texas *State Gazette*, and to unite with their friends at the North in the adoption of the measures of protection required for enabling them “to obtain a dense and compact population,” by becoming something “more than a mere agricultural people?” Can that end ever be attained without thorough and complete protection, and do not they themselves stand much more in need of such protection than the “abolitionists” of England and of the North, of whom they now complain?